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I. Introduction: Judge Henry J. Friendly’s Abortion Opinion
Even though my subject is Justice Lewis F. Powell’s vote
with the majority in Roe v. Wade,1 I begin with a few words about
the late United States Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly. Judge
Friendly is widely regarded as one of our most distinguished
jurists.2 What many may not know is that he authored a draft
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Washington
and Lee University School of Law. I appreciate those who helped me prepare the
remarks on this subject that I delivered at the Roe at 40 Symposium: Lyman
Johnson, Lynne Kohm, Brian Murchison, and several members of my family.
Mark Grunewald is due special thanks for his invaluable help in commenting on
both my remarks and on multiple drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Nora
Demleitner, Clarke Forsythe, Stephen Gilles, John Jeffries, Jeffrey D. Kahn,
and Ron Krotoszynski. I am also grateful to John Jacob for helping me access
the Powell Archives. Finally, thanks to the Frances Lewis Law Center for its
financial support.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See A. Raymond Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft
Abortion Opinion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1035 & n.1 (2006) (asserting
that Judge Friendly is one of “the greatest judges in our nation’s history” and
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opinion “in the first abortion-rights case ever filed in a federal
court.”3 The opinion was never issued because the case in
question, Hall v. Lefkowitz,4 a challenge to New York’s abortion
statute, was dismissed as moot when New York’s approach to
abortion was significantly liberalized in 1970.5
Judge Friendly’s law clerk at the time,6 now Senior United
States Circuit Judge Raymond Randolph, has published an
article that contains Friendly’s draft opinion.7 The short opinion
is well worth reading.8 Friendly believed there was a large gulf
between Griswold v. Connecticut,9 which accorded privacy
protection to contraceptive use within marriage,10 and the
argument that privacy doctrine also affords a right to destroy a
fetus.11 To him, Griswold did “not seem to afford even a slender
foundation” for the challenge to New York’s abortion statute.12 “A
holding that the privacy of sexual intercourse is protected against
governmental intrusion scarcely carries as a corollary that when
this has resulted in conception, government may not forbid
destruction of the fetus.”13 Almost ten years later, Judge Friendly
reaffirmed his view that Griswold provided “no real precedential
support” for the decision in Roe.14 The Court gave “no real answer
collecting sources to support such a claim).
3. Id. at 1035.
4. 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
5. See Randolph, supra note 2, at 1037 & n.15 (citing to Act of Apr. 11,
1970, ch. 127, 1970 N.Y. Laws 852 (codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAWS
§ 125.05(3) (McKinney 2004)) as allowing “abortion on demand”).
6. See id. at 1036 (“I was his law clerk on the case.”).
7. See generally id. (containing both evaluation and circumstances of
particular portions of the draft, as well as the draft in its entirety as an
Appendix).
8. See id. at 1057–61 (providing a copy of Judge Friendly’s draft opinion).
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. See id. at 486 (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred.”).
11. Randolph, supra note 2, at 1057.
12. Id. (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
13. Id. (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14. Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
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to the argument that the state’s interest in preserving the fetus
was alone a sufficient justification for drastic limitation of
abortions. The invocation of a ‘right of privacy’ was not
convincing.”15
To Judge Friendly, abortion was a public policy dispute that
“must be fought out through the democratic process.”16 He
suggested that had he been a legislator, he would have favored
more liberal abortion laws.17 But, as a judge, he saw no basis for
holding that the States, in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment,
“placed at risk of judicial condemnation [abortion-restricting]
statutes then so generally in effect and still not without a rational
basis, however one may regard them from a policy standpoint.”18
He “simply [could not] find . . . anything” in the Amendment’s
“vague contours” to prohibit New York’s restrictive statute.19
Judge Randolph writes that he has often wondered whether
Friendly’s views, if published, would have influenced other lower
federal courts with pending abortion cases and perhaps even the
Supreme Court itself.20 I am puzzled in a different way: Why did
Justice Lewis Powell not write something akin to Friendly’s
opinion as a dissent in Roe v. Wade? Part II, after showing that
Powell’s Roe vote was surprising, will demonstrate that no
satisfactory explanation has yet been offered. Part III argues that
Powell’s vote negatively impacts his legacy.

Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 34 (1978).
15. Id.
16. Randolph, supra note 2, at 1061 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. See id. at 1059 (showing Judge Friendly believed that more liberal
abortion laws were supported by strong arguments). Judge Friendly’s policy
preference for liberalized abortion laws is confirmed by his biographer. See
DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY, GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 190–92 (2012)
(“[Judge Friendly] stated that he personally favored some [abortion] right,
especially in the early months of pregnancy.”).
18. Randolph, supra note 2, at 1060 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. at 1061 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
20. Id. at 1043.
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II. Justice Powell’s Baffling Vote
A. Contrary to Expectations

President Richard Nixon, in announcing his decision to
appoint Lewis Powell to the Supreme Court, stated that he
nominated only those who shared his “judicial philosophy,”21
which was that “the duty of a judge [is] to interpret the
Constitution and not to place himself above the Constitution or
outside the Constitution. He should not twist or bend the
Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal political and
social views.”22 Justice Powell, in his nomination hearings,
stressed “the importance of judicial restraint, especially at the
Supreme Court level.”23 He also emphasized that a Justice should
“make a conscious and determined effort to put aside his own
political and economic views and his own predilections and to the
extent possible to put aside whatever subtle influences may exist
from his own background and experience.”24 General public
21. Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Address to the Nation
Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H.
Rehnquist To Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
(Oct. 21, 1971), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3196.
22. Id. Professor John Hart Ely points out that, although this language
appears to embody a conservative judicial philosophy, President Nixon then
gave an example—his belief that the Court had done too much to weaken law
enforcement—that revealed that Nixon would have been happy were his own
personal views reflected in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. John Hart Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 945–46
(1973).
23. Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 219 (1971) [hereinafter
Nominations] (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
24. Id.; see also id. at 236 (“I would certainly not consider it appropriate to
inject my own personal views with respect to a constitutional question of an act
of Congress.”). Powell expressed this same view of a judge’s role after his
retirement from the Court: “The respect given the Court by the public, and by
the other branches of government, rests in large part on the knowledge that the
Court is not composed of unelected judges free to write their policy views into
law. Rather, the Court is a body vested with the duty to exercise the judicial
power prescribed by the Constitution.” Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and
Judicial Restraint, 44 REC. ASS’N B. N.Y.C. 813, 819 (1989). “[T]he judicial
branch has a constitutional obligation to avoid making . . . fundamentally
legislative choices.” Id. at 824 n.43. Whenever courts intervene in what are
properly political disputes, they “unwisely, and in my view unconstitutionally,
denigrate the political process and the distinct nature of our tripartite system of
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opinion was that Powell would strictly construe the
Constitution,25 a view shared by Wilma Heide, President of the
National Organization for Women, who testified against him
because of his strict constructionist credentials.26 Heide expressed
her hope that the Fourteenth Amendment would be applied “in
the interest[s] of women”27 but did not think Powell would
support this development.28 Instead, his record of omission in

government.” Id.
25. See id. at 92–109 (reprinting numerous newspaper articles commenting
on Powell’s nomination, submitted by Senator Byrd of Virginia, that presented
his anticipated conservative judicial approach as a positive trait). Some people
believed differently. Professor Gerald Gunther writes of “the glib certitude of the
early 1970’s that insisted that [Powell], like all Nixon appointees, would be a
predictable, fungible member of the right wing.” Gerald Gunther, A Tribute to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 409, 410 (1987).
26. See Nominations, supra note 23, at 425–26, 428 (testimony of Wilma
Scott Heide, President, National Organization for Women, Inc.) (construing
strict constructionism to uphold “sexist” Supreme Court precedent as cited and
interpreted by Ms. Heide). Powell admitted to being a strict constructionist in a
particular sense. After Arkansas Senator John McClellan expressed his own
opinion on the meaning of that term—that “it is the Congress’ prerogative to set
national policy in those areas within the framework of the Constitution and that
that policy should stand and not be overruled by a court because the court’s
philosophy is that it was bad policy”—Powell said, “I certainly subscribe to those
views, Senator.” Id. at 237 (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
27. Id. at 437 (testimony of Wilma Scott Heide). Several witnesses at
Powell’s hearing had a different concern about the Constitution—that it would
be used to overturn laws protective of fetal life. See id. at 473 (testimony of
Lucille Buffalino, Celebrate Life Committee of Long Island, N.Y.) (“If any
inquiry discloses that any of the present nominees are disposed to reach for the
label ‘unconstitutional’ to strike down laws protecting the unborn . . . , we ask
that such nominations be rejected.”); id. at 478 (testimony of Annette
Garkowski, L.I.F.E. Committee of New York) (“If it is ascertained that [the
nominees Rehnquist’s and Powell’s] disposition is to regard laws protecting
unborn life as less worthy of judicial respect than laws in the criminal area, we
urge rejection of Mr. Powell and Mr. Rehnquist.”); id. at 479 (testimony of
Florence Quigley, Brooklyn Right to Life Committee) (“If . . . Mr. Powell
believe[s] . . . that the Supreme Court should declare unconstitutional . . . the
State statutes which have traditionally regarded the unborn child as a human
being . . . , then we ask . . . that the Senate . . . reject [him] . . . .”). These pro-life
witnesses “were politely ignored.” JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. 354 (1994).
28. Nominations, supra note 23, at 437 (stating that Ms. Heide was
“[un]persuad[ed]” that Justice Powell would represent women’s “voice[s]”
through “effective action”).
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regard to women’s issues portended injustice for women were he
confirmed.29
Is Justice Powell’s vote with the Roe majority consistent with
any concept of judicial restraint? Obviously not. Powell
biographer Professor John Jeffries writes that
[a]s constitutional law, the . . . decision was an astonishing act
of judicial innovation. . . . Nothing in the conventional sources
of constitutional interpretation pointed to that result. There
was nothing in the document’s text . . . or its history, or the
preexisting legal traditions that the Constitution might be
thought to have incorporated. There was nothing in the usual
sources of legal reasoning to suggest that abortion was a
constitutional right.30

Thus, “[a]s an act of conventional [constitutional] interpretation,
Roe v. Wade is next to impossible. . . . Abortion was not found in
the Constitution; it was put there by the Supreme Court.”31
29. See Nominations, supra note 23, at 428, 433–35 (testimony of Wilma
Scott Hedie) (referring to Powell’s alleged failures to act on women’s behalf in
leading his law firm and during his presidency of the American Bar
Association); see also JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 233 (noting that feminist
opposition was predicated on an absence of a record as opposed to any particular
instance of injustice). Powell’s future vote in Roe brands Heide’s opposition as
richly ironic. There are other examples. A pro-choice litigator commented that
there was “‘nothing in [Powell’s] background[] that would give any supporter of
abortion law repeal or reform any comfort or hope for a favorable judicial
solution.’” DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 512 (1994) (quoting pro-choice litigator Joe Nellis).
It is also ironic that some opposed holding Roe over for reargument from fear
that Powell would vote to uphold the challenged abortion statute. See id. at 521,
548 (discussing various parties that wanted to defeat any motion for
reargument); JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 333, 337 (same).
30. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 348. For similar assessments of Roe’s
weaknesses, see J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 28
(2012) [hereinafter WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY]; Ely, supra
note 22, at 935–36, 949. “Roe’s flaw was not just that it was anti-originalist, but
that is was also inimical to the values of textualism, self-restraint, separation of
powers, and federalism as well.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions,
and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (2009) [hereinafter
Wilkinson, Of Guns]. One scholar writes that due in part to the “almost
complete exclusion of the sources of constitutional law, Blackmun’s opinion for
the Court is probably the weakest of any major decision in American history.”
L.A. Powe, Jr., The Court Between Hegemonies, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 31, 39
(1992).
31. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 361.
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Therefore, a question is posed, Jeffries writes, “that cries out for
answer”:32 How could Powell, “supposedly a fan of judicial
restraint, . . . find a right to abortion in the Constitution,”33
thereby taking a “plunge into judicial activism”?34
One response would be to point out that there is “a competing
approach” to constitutional law,
the tradition of fundamental rights. This view holds that the
Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to safeguard
rights not specified in the document. This approach is not
interpretive. It does not rely on the text but on moral
reasoning, extrinsic to the document itself, that identifies
certain interests as fundamental to the human personality. . . .
Whatever the source, fundamental rights are protected
because they are simply too important to leave to legislative
control.35

Whatever the merits of a fundamental rights analysis,36 it
explains Powell’s Roe vote only if he accepted this approach at the
time of the decision, January 22, 1973,37 just over one year after
32. Id. at 347.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 350. Powell’s vote no doubt astounded those holding pro-choice
views who had worried about his appointment. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text (referring to several pro-choice advocates concerned over
Justice Powell’s appointment). It also astonished his law clerk, Larry
Hammond, who had anticipated the opposite result. See GARROW, supra note 29,
at 575 (quoting Hammond as saying it “hit [him] like a ton of bricks”). Although
the surprised pro-choice parties were no doubt thrilled, Powell’s vote contrary to
expectations is no less perplexing, especially because, according to Jeffries, he
“found the decision easy. . . . There was no equivocation, no debate, no exchange
of memoranda, no tentative drafts. . . . Despite the bitter passions aroused by
the issue of abortion, Powell’s initial consideration of it was straightforward,
free from doubt, almost routine.” JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 346.
35. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 361–62; see also EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 361 (1998) (stating that fundamental rights jurisprudence looks
to external sources such as “moral philosophy and political theory”). Professor
Jeffries argues that the fundamental rights approach is now dominant in
constitutional law, an outcome due largely to Roe. See JEFFRIES, supra note 27,
at 362–64 (“Roe was not the first . . . decision to create a new constitutional
right, but it was at once the most extreme and the most important [for future
cases].”).
36. For my criticism of this approach as it relates to Roe, see infra Section
II.B.
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
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he was sworn in as a Justice on January 7, 1972.38 Professor
Jeffries asserts that although “Powell later moved toward” a more
expansive concept of the Constitution,39 “he was at the outset of
his career a disciple of judicial restraint.”40 “He thought the
Constitution might be construed like a statute—controlled by a
close reading of the text, informed by the historical intentions of
those who drafted it, with judges resolving only borderline
ambiguities.”41 Jeffries’s conclusion? Powell’s vote in Roe “forever
challenge[s]” his self-concept “as a disciple of restraint.”42
B. Not Satisfactorily Explained by Griswold
Professor Jeffries writes that one way to reconcile Powell’s
vote with his conservative judicial philosophy is to argue, as
Powell “always claimed,”43 that Griswold, contrary to Judge
Friendly’s view,44 actually provides precedential support for
Roe.45 Given what Jeffries states about Powell’s initial views,46 it
is curious that he does not comment on the strangeness of the
Justice’s reliance upon Griswold. That decision plainly embodies
a fundamental rights approach,47 whereas Jeffries states that
38. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 243.
39. Id. at 410. For the argument that Roe was inconsistent with Powell’s
subsequently expressed concept of fundamental rights jurisprudence, see infra
notes 94–103 and accompanying text.
40. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 410. Contrary to what this quotation
suggests, Powell still espoused support for judicial restraint after his retirement
for the Court. See generally Powell, supra note 24.
41. Id. at 409.
42. Id. at 349.
43. Id. at 348.
44. Supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
45. See JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 348 (“Powell always claimed, . . . that
his vote in Roe was supported by precedent . . . .”); GARROW, supra note 29, at
576 (noting that Powell believed Griswold and Roe “presented the same basic
question”). This approach, of course, assumes Griswold’s own constitutional
legitimacy, a suspect presupposition for some. See Randolph, supra note 2, at
1043–44 (“[T]here are many objections to Griswold’s reasoning . . . .”).
46. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text (showing that, at first,
Justice Powell was a stalwart of judicial restraint and textualism).
47. The right of privacy was famously premised in the emanations and
penumbras from specific constitutional guarantees. See LAZARUS, supra note 35,
at 252–54 (providing historical context for the judicial evolution of the right of
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Powell, early in his career, “was not ready for the soaring phrases
of the Bill of Rights that suggest so much yet specify so little.”48
Beyond the general oddity of Powell’s dependence upon
Griswold, other aspects of that decision make it an unpersuasive
explanation for his Roe vote. Griswold involved contraception and
Roe involved abortion, a major distinction to Judge Friendly.49
Powell, however, believed that the distance between the two
wasn’t “that great” because “both involved sexuality and
reproduction.”50 But this is like saying there’s no difference
between a firecracker and a nuclear device because both involve
explosives.51 There is a fundamental distinction between
preventing a human life from forming and destroying that life
after its creation.52 Thus, the jump from contraception in
privacy).
48. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 409–10. Jeffries ultimately acknowledges
Griswold’s inadequacy as support for Roe. See infra note 104 and accompanying
text (noting that, in light of Griswold and other precedent, Roe’s holding was
“venturesome”).
49. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Friendly’s interpretation).
50. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 348.
51. For an explanation on why Justice Byron White would have disagreed
with this analogy, see infra note 70.
52. The biological distinction is undeniable. Sperm and egg cells prior to
fertilization retain their own distinct genetic identities; they also die soon
absent fertilization. See ALEXANDER TSIARAS, FROM CONCEPTION TO BIRTH: A LIFE
UNFOLDS 42 (2002) (discussing the science of fertilization); TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1555 (20th ed. 2005) (defining “ovulation”). Fertilization
produces a genetically distinct, living human organism. See TSIARAS, supra, at 6,
16, 50–51 (outlining the details of fertilization at a cellular level). To label this
very early life not “actually present,” as Justice Douglas does, Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 218 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Tom C. Clark, Religion,
Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 10
(1969) (internal quotation marks omitted)), is scientifically indefensible. With
time and nutrition, a child is subsequently born. TSIARAS, supra, at 28. Some
argue that the fragility of early human life demonstrates that fertilization lacks
profound significance: studies show that as many as two-thirds of zygotes fail to
survive until live birth. Gregg Easterbrook, Abortion and Brain Waves, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 2000, at 21, 22. Some fail to implant in the uterine wall and
others “are lost to natural miscarriage.” Id. Surely this means that early human
life has no particular importance. See id. (arguing that brain activity, and not
genetic uniqueness, is most “important”). This argument is unpersuasive. Onehundred per cent of the humans alive today will die. Does this mean that we’re
all ultimately valueless? Furthermore, couldn’t the extreme fragility of preborn
human life logically lead to the opposite conclusion—that unborn life is
infinitely precious and should be protected to the extent possible? People may
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Griswold to the abortion right in Roe constituted a “tectonic
shift.”53 Some contest this characterization. For example,
Professor David Garrow, in a passage revealing his own view plus
that of another influential scholar, writes that “in 1981 [Professor
Laurence] Tribe accurately told a congressional committee that
‘Roe v. Wade was but a logical extension of Griswold.’”54
Ironically, the most powerful refutation of any notion that
Roe was only the “slightest step past Griswold”55 comes from
language in Roe itself: “The pregnant woman cannot be isolated
in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one
accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the
human uterus. . . . The situation is therefore inherently different
certainly disagree on such complex subjects, a common occurrence in a
democracy. A key question posed by this Article is whether one side of this
dispute should be enshrined in constitutional law, in effect silencing all
competing views. Infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
53. WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 29.
“Unlike . . . contraception, abortion ‘involves the purposeful termination of a
potential life.’ The abortion decision must therefore ‘be recognized as sui generis,
different in kind from the others that the Court has protected’ . . . One cannot
ignore the fact that . . . the decision to abort necessarily involves the destruction
of a fetus.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
54. GARROW, supra note 29, at 615. The intervening decision in Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), is often relied upon to help bridge the gap, see
LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 364, in particular a statement by Justice Brennan:
“If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.” Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. Eisenstadt, however, was an equal protection
case, see id. at 447 & n.7 (“[W]e do not have to address the statute’s validity . . .
because the law fails to satisfy . . . [the] equal protection standard.”);
consequently, “Brennan’s comments about the right to privacy were gratuitous
dicta.” LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 364. Moreover, the profound distinction
between contraception and abortion, see supra note 52 and accompanying text
(discussing the science behind the distinction), cannot be negated by the mere
declaration that begetting and bearing a child are synonymous. This is
especially true because Brennan’s wording was trumped up: he “added the
crucial ‘bear or beget’ language . . . precisely because, while he was working on
his Eisenstadt draft, the Court was already considering Roe. . . . Eisenstadt
provided the ideal opportunity to build a rhetorical bridge between the right to
use contraception and the abortion issue pending in Roe.” LAZARUS, supra note
35, at 365; see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT 211 (1979) (noting that Brennan referred “to the decision to
‘bear’ a child with the abortion case in mind”).
55. LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 366.
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from marital intimacy . . . with which . . . Griswold . . . [was]
ultimately concerned.”56 Admittedly, this passage is somewhat
vague. By referring to “marital intimacy,” perhaps the Court was
not referring to contraception as the key fact distinguishing
Griswold from the abortion issue, but rather to the privacy of
sexual relations within the marital home.57 Still, if the Court had
not intended to include contraception as grounds for
distinguishing Griswold, why would it have referred to embryos
and fetuses? No such “developing young” can exist if
contraception prevents fertilization, and abortion necessarily
terminates their existence.58
One would have expected that the Court’s allusion to the
inherent difference between contraception and abortion would
have naturally led it to reject Griswold’s precedential value for
those seeking an abortion right.59 This did not happen. Instead,
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (emphasis added).
57. Professor Ely would support this interpretation. To him, unlike Justice
Byron White, see infra note 70 (noting Justice White’s distinction between
contraception and abortion), “[c]ontraception and at least early abortion
obviously have much in common.” Ely, supra note 22, at 929 n.67. For Ely,
Griswold was principally concerned with “likely invasions of the privacy of the
bedroom.” Id. at 929 n.69; see also infra note 59 (discussing the term “marital
intimacy” and its contextual interpretation in Roe and Griswold).
58. See supra note 53 (supporting the argument that abortion terminates a
life). Additional support for the significance of contraception in distinguishing
Griswold comes from the history of the Roe opinion. The “inherently different”
paragraph referenced in the text, Roe, 410 U.S. at 159, initially appeared in the
first draft of the opinion in Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). This draft was circulated to the Justices’ conference on May 25, 1972,
and reviewed by Powell on October 2, 1972. First Draft of Doe v. Bolton Opinion,
at 1 (circulated May 25, 1972) (unpublished draft opinion), available at
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/70-40_Doe_Bolton.pdf (on file
with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law).
Subsequent to the subject paragraph comes this language, which did not make
it into the Roe opinion: “The heart of the matter is that somewhere, either
forthwith at conception, or at ‘quickening,’ or at birth, or at some point in
between, another being becomes involved and the privacy the woman possessed
has become dual rather than sole.” Id. at 10. Powell’s handwritten margin notes
state, “[S]ituation different from other privacy cases” and “‘[A]nother being’
becomes involved.” Id.
59. In addition to the differentiating impact of the developing child, the Roe
Court’s reference to “marital intimacy” reveals another reason for discounting
Griswold’s authoritativeness for the Roe result: “Griswold, after all, was
grounded in the traditional privacy of acts within marriage. Roe reached far
beyond that context.” JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 348; see also LAZARUS, supra
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the “inherently different” passage relates to a different issue,60
addressed by the Court after the constitutional right to abortion
had already been declared.61 Earlier, in “the opinion’s most
crucial sentence,”62 Justice Blackmun, after proclaiming a right of
privacy based upon decisions such as Griswold, simply asserts
that the privacy right “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”63 There is
no reference whatsoever to the profound distinction between
contraception and abortion.64 Apparently Justice Powell did not
note 35, at 363 (noting that the abortion right does “not implicate the privacy of
the home,” nor is “it necessarily linked to marriage”); Ely, supra note 22, at 930
(suggesting enforcement of the Connecticut law “would have been virtually
impossible without the most outrageous sort of governmental prying into the
privacy of the home”). It is true that Eisenstadt struck down a statute
prohibiting contraceptive use by unmarried persons, but its weak precedential
value for Roe has already been noted. Supra note 54.
There is another key distinction between Griswold and Roe. “The
prohibition on the use of contraception that Griswold struck down . . . was a
pure anachronism, unique in the nation, almost never invoked, and ineffectual
except to preclude birth control clinics from distributing contraceptives to the
poor.” LAZARUS, supra note 35 at 363–64; see also JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at
351 (“In Griswold, the Court had not so much overridden the legislative action
as updated it.”). “The right to abortion presented a very different case. At the
time of Roe, almost every state regulated abortion in some fashion, some quite
strictly, and had done so for a century or more. In many places these laws were
the subject of debate, but by and large they were still enforced.” LAZARUS, supra
note 35, at 364.
60. See infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the issue further).
61. It is even more astounding that the Roe Court considered the fetus’s
possible status as a Fourteenth Amendment person only after declaring the
abortion right. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–59 (analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment’s
applicability only after referring to abortion as a “right of personal privacy”).
This is true even though the Court acknowledged that were fetal constitutional
personhood established, the challenge to the Texas abortion statute would
“collapse[].” Id. at 156–57.
62. LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 356.
63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
64. The Court was no doubt influenced by other courts’ abortion decisions.
For example, the California Supreme Court, also with no mention of how
abortion differs from contraception, simply declared that a woman’s
fundamental right “to choose whether to bear children” flows from decisions
such as Griswold that acknowledged a privacy right “in matters related to
marriage, family, and sex.” People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969).
Other prior decisions, referenced by the Roe Court, but not discussed, Roe, 410
U.S. at 155, emphasized the contraception/abortion dichotomy. See, e.g., Corkey
v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1251–52 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (reasoning that
abortion is not logically synonymous with contraception); Steinberg v. Brown,
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consider this difference either.65 “Presented with the challenge of
extending the right to privacy from contraception to abortion, the
Court largely skipped the process of interpretation and moved on
to announcing its conclusions.”66 By including the word “largely,”
this statement, by Justice Harry Blackmun’s former clerk,
321 F. Supp. 741, 745–46 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (same). As the Steinberg court put it,
to extend Griswold to the abortion context would “equat[e] contraception and
abortion [which would] pay no attention to the facts of biology.” Steinberg, 321
F. Supp. at 746.
65. Justice Powell’s law clerk, Larry Hammond, ignored the
contraception/abortion dichotomy in the Bench Memo submitted to Powell on
October 9, 1972. See generally Bench Memorandum from Larry Hammond, Law
Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme
Court of the U.S. (Oct. 9, 1972) [hereinafter Bench Memorandum],
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/70-18_RoeWade.pdf (on file
with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law). After
a paragraph describing Griswold as the “seminal precedent” for the
fundamental rights doctrine, the Memo states that “[i]t would not be difficult for
this Ct [sic] to find a fundamental right of a woman to control the decision
whether to go through the experience of pregnancy and assume the
responsibilities that occur thereafter.” Id. at 11. Hammond makes no comment
on the fact that Griswold dealt with contraception, not abortion. The Memo
commends another decision, Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972)
[hereinafter Abele II], to Powell’s attention. Bench Memorandum, supra at 10.
The Abele court does not ignore the contraception/abortion dichotomy. Far from
it. But the court, rather than relying upon the distinction to deny the abortion
right, the approach followed in Corkey v. Edwards and Steinberg v. Brown,
supra note 64, instead does just the opposite by arguing that “[t]he right to an
abortion is of even greater concern to the woman than the right to use a
contraceptive protected in Griswold . . . for contraception is not the only means
of preventing pregnancy, whereas abortion is the only means of terminating an
unwanted pregnancy.” Abele II, 351 F. Supp. at 227 (emphasis added). A copy of
the Abele slip decision is in the Powell Archives. See generally Slip Opinion of
Abele v. Markle (filed Sept. 20, 1972) (reviewed and marked up by Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., Oct. 10, 1972) (slip opinion duplicate) (on file with the Powell
Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law), http://law.wlu.
edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/70-18_RoeWadeOpinionDistrict.pdf.
The
majority opinion shows many of Powell’s handwritten notations, including
emphasis markings in the left margin opposite the preceding quotation. Id. at
7–18. It is telling that the dissenting opinion in Abele does not show a single
notation. Id. at 23–33. Thus, Powell perhaps never even read the passage
arguing that Griswold was inapplicable in evaluating an abortion statute
because that decision focused “upon the choice as to the begetting of new life and
not upon the destruction of life already begotten.” Abele II, 351 F. Supp. at 234
(Clarie, J., dissenting); see also Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 814–15 (D.
Conn. 1972) [hereinafter Abele I] (Clarie, J., dissenting) (“[Griswold] is not
applicable to the facts of the present case.”).
66. LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 366.
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Edward Lazarus,67 is too forgiving. The Court (and Powell), in
regard to the contraception/abortion dichotomy, completely
skipped interpretation in favor of bald assertion.68
Later, after announcing the abortion right, the Court did
focus on the developing child as part of its inquiry into whether
Texas could demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify
regulation of the fundamental right of abortion.69 Judge Friendly
presumably seriously disagreed with this ordering. To him, the
fetus demanded consideration as part of analyzing whether there
was a fundamental abortion right in the first instance.70 It was
unnecessary
67. See id. at xi (discussing the benefits of Lazarus’s clerkship for Justice
Blackmun). Lazarus clerked for Blackmun over ten years after the Roe decision.
See id. at 20–21 (describing Lazarus’s clerkship interview with Justice
Blackmun in 1988).
68. The Court did present an after-the-fact justification of the abortion
right based upon the impact of abortion restrictions upon women. See infra
notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the Court in
deciding that abortion was a fundamental right).
69. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 159–62 (1973) (“Texas urges
that . . . life begins at conception, . . . and that, therefore, the State has a
compelling interest . . . .”). Professor Jeffries notes that the Court begins its
discussion with an “incoherent” passage. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 340. Justice
Blackmun states that the Court “need not resolve the difficult question of when
life begins,” Roe, 410 U.S. at 159, but then in effect answers that “very question”
by holding that Texas “could not protect fetal life from conception.” JEFFRIES,
supra note 27, at 341.
70. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Friendly’s thoughts on the subject). Justice Byron White agreed:
That the decision involves the destruction of the fetus renders it
different in kind from the decision not to conceive in the first place.
This difference does not go merely to the weight of the state interest
in regulating abortion; it affects as well the characterization of the
liberty interest itself. . . .
My point can be illustrated by drawing on a related area in which
fundamental liberty interests have been found: childrearing. The
Court’s decisions . . . can be read for the proposition that parents have
a fundamental liberty interest to make decisions with respect to the
upbringing of their children. But no one would suggest that this
fundamental liberty extends to assaults committed upon children by
their parents. It is not the case that parents have a fundamental
liberty to engage in such activities and that the State may intrude to
prevent them only because it has a compelling interest in the wellbeing of children; rather, such activities, by their very nature, should
be viewed as outside the scope of the fundamental liberty interest.
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 n.2
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to determine just when a fetus becomes a ‘human being.’ It is
enough that the legislature was not required to accept [the
law’s challengers’] demeaning characterizations of it. Modern
biology instructs that the genetic code that will dictate the
entire future of the fetus is formed as early as the ___ day
after conception; the fetus is thus something more than inert
matter. The rules of property and of tort have come
increasingly to recognize its rights. . . . [I]t would be
incongruous in their face for us to hold that a legislature went
beyond constitutional bounds in protecting the fetus . . . .71

(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (arguing that to
consider an “act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in isolation
from its effect upon other people—[is] rather like inquiring whether there is a
liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at hand happens to involve its
discharge into another person’s body”). Thus, White would characterize my
firecracker/nuclear bomb analogy, supra note 51 and accompanying text, as
being too weak. Comparing these two explosives reveals only a difference in
degree, whereas the egg/sperm versus zygote comparison is a difference in kind.
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (discussing the science of
zygotes). For criticism of White’s constitutional analysis, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 96–98 (1990) (“The approach
suggested by . . . [Justice] White . . . would do violence to all our rights.”).
71. Randolph, supra note 2, at 1059 (underscore in original). Judge
Friendly’s unissued opinion was written in 1970. Id. at 1035. In 1972, an
important decision, although largely overlooked, declared the same view of
legislative power. Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y.
1972), has an interesting connection to the specific issue addressed by Judge
Friendly. His opinion evaluated New York’s older, restrictive abortion statute.
Supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. Byrn assessed the validity of the
liberalized New York abortion statute that rendered the older law moot. Byrn,
286 N.E.2d at 888. The new law was attacked as constitutionally invalid for
denying the right to life to all those fetuses it deprived of legal protection. See
id. (“The issue, a novel one in the courts of law, is whether children in embryo
are and must be recognized as legal persons or entities entitled under the State
and Federal Constitutions to a right to life.”). The court rejected the challenge,
holding that the “Constitution does not confer or require legal personality for
the unborn.” Id. at 890. But the court went on to say that “the Legislature may”
accord legal personality to the unborn should it decide to do so. Id. As a
concurring judge expressed the holding, “the formidable task of resolving this
issue is not for the courts. Rather, the extent to which fetal life should be
protected ‘is a value judgment not committed to the discretion of judges but
reposing instead in the representative branch of government.’” Id. at 891 (Jasen,
J., concurring) (quoting Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (W.D.N.C.
1971)). Interestingly, the Roe Court obscured this significant aspect of Byrn, a
decision rendered, after all, by the Court of Appeals of New York, one of the
nation’s most prestigious courts, by citing the case only for its holding that the
unborn were not constitutional persons. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
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Judge Friendly correctly asserts that a legislature should be
able to generally prohibit abortion without first finding that a
fetus is a human being.72 The Roe Court disagreed,73 and so did
Justice Powell, whose support of the abortion right was based in
part on his belief “that a fertilized embryo was [not] a fully
recognized human life.”74 But, as pointed out by Professor John
72. It is important to note, however, that Judge Friendly himself relied
upon increasing legal recognition given to fetal rights in the non-abortion
context. Supra text accompanying note 71. The Roe Court’s discussion of this
trend, Roe, 410 U.S. at 161–62, is so incomplete as to be irresponsible. See
Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 743–44 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., concurring)
(“[S]cholars have repeatedly pointed to inaccuracies in Roe[] . . . .”); James Bopp,
Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Right to Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe
for Reversal, 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 181, 254–55 (1989) (urging that Roe’s discussion
of wrongful death actions for unborn children is inaccurate and incomplete); Ely,
supra note 22, at 925 (asserting that the “bodies of doctrine” relied upon by the
Roe Court were erroneously applied and “tend to undercut rather than support
its conclusion”); David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v.
Wade, 45 MO. L. REV. 639, 652–56 (1980) (critiquing the Roe Court’s analysis);
Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in
the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 47–54 (1993) (same). This
trend has sped up exponentially since Roe. See Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 737–40
(Parker, J., concurring) (quoting statistics of a marked increase in fetal homicide
laws); Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of the Unborn Child Under State
Law, 6 ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 143–44 (2011) (same).
73. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (finding that the law had never recognized “the
unborn . . . as persons in the whole sense”). Consequently, Texas, “by adopting
one theory of life, . . . [could not] override the rights of the pregnant woman that
are at stake.” Id.
74. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 350. Powell’s view of the human embryo
hardly makes Griswold convincing precedential support for Roe, which
constitutionalized abortion of developing human lives far beyond the embryo
stage. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. In fact, it was Powell himself who was
instrumental in extending an unimpaired abortion right all the way to fetal
viability. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 341–42, 346; infra notes 156–64 and
accompanying text. Thus, it is shocking to discover that Powell in 1979
described Roe as “sustaining the right of a woman, with the approval of her
doctor, to have an abortion during the first trimester.” Constitutional
Interpretation: An Interview with Justice Lewis Powell, KENYON C. ALUMNI
BULL., Summer 1979, at 16 [hereinafter Constitutional Interpretation]. In view
of Powell’s own influence in extending Roe’s reach, could he really not have
grasped the decision’s full impact? Yet Professor Jeffries’s biography reports this
same anomaly. The book notes that the Justice “thought it intolerable that the
law should interfere with a woman’s right to control her own body during early
pregnancy,” yet, in the very next paragraph, Jeffries states that it was Powell
who made “sure that the woman’s right reached beyond the end of the first
trimester, as Blackmun originally proposed, to the point of fetal viability.”
JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 346. One would think that Powell’s apparent self-
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Hart Ely in his famous critique of Roe,75 “[d]ogs are not ‘persons
in the whole sense[,]’ . . . but that does not mean the state cannot
prohibit killing them.”76 Roe suggests that widespread
disagreement on fetal status prevents a state from acting in
accord with its own legislative judgment.77 Powell’s papers
suggest that this point was important to him too.78 But Judge
contradiction would have drawn a comment from Jeffries. In any event, the
result in Roe is even further divorced from Powell’s stated rationale. If his
support of the abortion right was confined to early pregnancy, why didn’t he at
least protest the expansive post-viability health exception, which allows no
meaningful protection for fetuses “even on the verge of a full-term delivery.”
Samuel W. Calhoun, Stopping Philadelphia Abortion Provider Kermit Gosnell
and Preventing Others Like Him: An Outcome That Both Pro-Choicers and ProLifers Should Support, 57 VILL. L. REV. 1, 37–40 (2012); see also infra note 123
(arguing that Roe provides no meaningful fetal protection post-viability).
75. Professor David Garrow emphasizes the importance of Professor Ely’s
attack on Roe. See GARROW, supra note 29, at 609 (“Far and away the most
important critique of Roe v. Wade was written by . . . John Hart Ely.”). This
criticism is made more potent by Ely’s pro-choice public policy stance on
abortion. See Ely, supra note 22, at 923, 926, 947 (articulating why Ely believes
the Roe decision to be unfounded in constitutional law, despite his agreeing with
the underlying policy of pro-choice abortion liberalization).
76. Ely, supra note 22, at 926 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162
(1973)).
77. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159–62 (1973) (“In view of all [these
contrasting viewpoints], we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life,
Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”).
78. Powell’s clerk, Larry Hammond, in summarizing a recent decision
invalidating Connecticut’s abortion statute, Abele II, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn.
1972), wrote that the
crux of [District] Judge Newman’s analysis is that the state may not
bar abortional freedom altogether on the basis of a proposition that is
subject to such great public debate and affects individuals so
personally. . . . If there is a great dispute between people of good faith
about the significance of the state’s interest in the life of the unborn,
we will not allow it to take the right to decide away from the
individual.
Bench Memorandum, supra note 65, at 12. Justice Powell underlined the first
fifteen words of the quoted passage. Id; see also Memorandum from Larry
Hammond, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Supreme Court of the U.S., Regarding Abortion Cases (No. 70-18 & 70-40) 4
(Nov.
27,
1972),
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/7018_RoeWade.pdf (showing that Powell wrote “Yes” in the margin next to similar
language) (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University
School of Law). Admittedly, at this point in his Bench Memo, Hammond is
assuming a woman’s fundamental right to abortion choice. See Bench
Memorandum supra note 65, at 12 (“It would not be difficult for this Ct [sic] to
find a fundamental right of a woman to control the decision whether to go
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Friendly wondered “why does a state lack power to decide this
question when it can decide so many others where thinking is
equally divergent.”79
Although the Roe Court ignored the contraception/abortion
dichotomy at the critical point in its analysis80—when it
considered whether Griswold constitutionalized abortion—the
Court did state a rationale for declaring abortion a fundamental
right. According to Professor Ely, the Court “[a]pparently . . .
thought [this conclusion] . . . derived[d] from the passage that
immediately follow[ed] it,”81 i.e., an account of the burdens that
through the experience of pregnancy . . . .”). Still, he expresses a curious, if not
shocking, concept of how a democracy operates. Can a legislature only enact
valid laws in the absence of dispute? Does not our entire history as a country
refute this view?
79. Friendly, supra note 14, at 33 n.64. The Roe Court and Powell
attributed significance to disagreement about fetal status in regard to Texas’s
ability to demonstrate a State interest sufficient to generally override the
fundamental abortion right. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159–62 (“In view of all [these
contrasting viewpoints], we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life,
Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”); supra
note 78 and accompanying text (describing Powell’s indications of such a
significance through memoranda with his law clerk, Larry Hammond); see also
Abele II, 351 F. Supp. at 231 (“[T]he Supreme Court ruled that such a viewpoint
could not constitutionally be imposed by the power of the state upon individuals
who did not share this view.”). Judge Friendly rebutted the significance of that
disagreement in the context of arguing against initial recognition of a
fundamental right to abortion. Friendly, supra note 14, at 33–34 (“[Roe]
provided no real answer to the argument that the state’s interest in preserving
the fetus was alone a justification for drastic limitation of abortions.”). Justice
Byron White believed that the importance of disagreements about fetal status
could be overstated:
However one answers the metaphysical or theological question
whether the fetus is a ‘human being’ . . . one must at least
recognize . . . that the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells all the
genetic information that characterizes a member of the species homo
sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that species from
all others . . . .
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792
(1986) (White, J., dissenting). To Justice White, these incontrovertible facts
distinguished contraception from abortion and meant there was no fundamental
right to the latter. See supra note 70 (delineating more fully Justice White’s
views).
80. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (dissecting the Roe
Court’s conspicuous avoidance of the scientific and logical gap between
contraception and abortion).
81. Ely, supra note 22, at 932.
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denial of the abortion choice would impose upon women.82
Professor Ely believed that the enumerated “life-shaping costs of
having a child”83 were “[a]ll . . . true and ought to be taken very
seriously.”84 But Ely also thought these consequences had
“nothing to do with privacy in the Bill of Rights sense”85 or with
any other “value inferable from the Constitution.”86 Everyone’s
lifestyle is “constantly limited, often seriously, by governmental
regulation; and while many of us would prefer less direction,
granting that desire the status of a preferred constitutional right
would yield a system of ‘government’ virtually unrecognizable to
us and only slightly more recognizable to our forefathers.”87
Judge Friendly’s draft abortion opinion pointed out another
serious flaw in the Roe Court’s argumentation. Friendly well
understood “‘the hardship to a woman who is carrying and
ultimately bearing an unwanted child under the best of
circumstances.’”88 Less than ideal circumstances of various kinds
could “‘transform a hardship into austere tragedy.’”89 These
“humanitarian considerations” supported “repeal . . . [or]
substantial modification” of New York’s strict abortion law.90 Yet,
because “the legislature could permissibly consider the fetus itself
to deserve protection,”91 such decisions were policy choices “for
the elected representatives of the people, not for . . . appointed
judges.”92 Legislatures could choose among a variety of
82. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (listing potential physical harm during early
pregnancy and then six potential “detriment[s]” of child-rearing).
83. Ely, supra note 22, at 933.
84. Id. at 932. Ely also noted “that most of the factors enumerated also
apply to the inconvenience of having an unwanted two-year-old, or a senile
parent, around.” Id. at 932 n.81. Ely failed to mention, though, that several of
the listed detriments of unwanted pregnancy could be eliminated by giving the
baby up for adoption.
85. Id. at 932.
86. Id. at 933.
87. Id.
88. Randolph, supra note 2, at 1058 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft
opinion).
89. Id. (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion).
90. Id. at 1059 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotations
omitted).
91. Id. (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotations
omitted).
92. Id. at 1060 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotations
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approaches, “observe the results, and act again as observation
may dictate. Experience in one state may benefit others; this is
conspicuously an area for application of Mr. Justice Brandeis’
view that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be so utilized as
to prevent experimentation in the laboratories of the several
states.”93
The contraception/abortion dichotomy and the weaknesses in
the burdens-of-unwanted-pregnancy argument in themselves
demonstrate that Griswold offers little, if any, precedential
support for Roe. An additional argument strengthens this
conclusion. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,94 decided just over
four years after Roe, Justice Powell stated his understanding of
the scope of a fundamental rights approach to the Constitution.95
Judges are not “‘free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them.’”96 Instead, limits are supplied by “careful ‘respect for
the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society.’”97 These principles led Powell to
declare invalid a housing ordinance that defined family in a way
omitted).
93. Id. at 1060 (quoting Judge Friendly’s draft opinion) (internal quotations
omitted). Justice Brandeis’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment is perhaps most
appropriately summed up in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932): “There must be power in the States . . . to remould, through
experimentation, . . . to meet changing social . . . needs. . . . It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may . . . serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments . . . .” Id. (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
94. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
95. See id. at 500–01 (explaining that the rationale for other fundamental
rights involving family autonomy must extend to the right to live with one’s
extended family).
96. Id. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
97. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). Powell also emphasized the importance of a historical
restraint in equal protection cases. Id. at 503 nn.10–11. The first Moore footnote
just cited refers to Powell’s opinion in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which upheld Texas’s system for financing
public schools against an equal protection challenge. The Court concluded “that
this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the
searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications
or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.” Id. at 40. One scholar wrote
that “Powell’s efforts to make fundamental rights a closed class had a hollow
ring to it coming just two months after Roe.” Powe, supra note 30, at 38.
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that excluded grandchildren.98 “[T]he Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. . . .
[And] [o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family.”99
It would be difficult to overstate how dramatically abortion
differs from “the institution of family” in regard to its rootedness
“in this Nation’s history and tradition.”100 As noted by Justice
Rehnquist,
[t]he fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the
majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on
abortion for at least a century is a strong indication . . . that
the asserted right to an abortion is not “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”101

98. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 495–97 (striking down an East Cleveland
ordinance that limits occupancy of houses to a family but defines family to
include “only a few categories of individuals” that excluded a grandmother living
with two grandchildren who were themselves cousins).
99. Id. at 503–04. Given that Powell in this 1977 opinion grounds
fundamental rights in society’s “basic values” and the nation’s “history and
tradition,” it is surprising that he, in a 1979 interview, forsook an easy
opportunity to reiterate his position. The interviewer asked Powell to identify
the sources of principles the Justices use in interpreting broad mandates such
as the due process clause. Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 74, at 16.
Did they resort to “public opinion, American tradition, political theory, moral
philosophy of some sort, religion[?]” Id. One would have expected Justice Powell
to refer to his approach in Moore, but instead he basically dodged the question,
stating that it was too complex for a brief answer. Id. Elsewhere in the
interview, Powell referred to the Constitution in an unexpected way given his
approach in Moore: “The Constitution has been described, properly I think, as a
sort of living political organism. The Court has helped, by its decisions, to keep
the Constitution abreast of the vast changes that occur in the life of our nation.”
Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 503. Another telling comparison involves child-rearing, which,
according to Powell, has been recognized as a fundamental right “because it
reflects a ‘strong tradition’ founded on ‘the history and culture of Western
civilization,’ and because the parental role ‘is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition.’” Id. at 503 n.12 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)). It would be ludicrous to suggest that abortion freedom
could be accurately described in this way. See infra text accompanying notes
101–102 (identifying a lack of tradition regarding the right to abortion).
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Professor Ron Krotoszynski
argues that “[a]n approach that gives dispositive effect to the prior existence of
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Justice White believed this conclusion was corroborated by the
“continuing and deep division of the people . . . over the question
of abortion.”102 Thus, under Powell’s own articulation of the
requirements for finding fundamental rights, Roe was wrong.
Rather than recognizing “values animating the Constitution,” the
Court, in declaring abortion a fundamental right, instead
“engage[d] . . . in the unrestrained imposition of its own,
extraconstitutional value preferences.”103
The foregoing section has shown that Griswold is insufficient
precedential support for Roe. Thus, “Griswold as precedent” is an

laws proscribing a particular course of conduct, and no effect whatsoever to the
rampant repeal or invalidation of such laws, fails to honor the notion that
‘tradition is a living thing’ or engage ‘tradition’ in a meaningful fashion.” Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting
Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 1015 (2006) (citation omitted).
He advocates “state counting . . . [as] a useful way of identifying and protecting
the traditions from which we have broken, which are no less deserving of
constitutional protection than those traditions from which we have come.” Id. at
1022–23. Here, Krotoszynski alludes to Justice Harlan’s famous statement
about substantive due process rights in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Krotoszynski, supra at 1014–15. A state-counting
approach, however, even should one accept it as constitutionally appropriate,
would do nothing to justify Roe, for the decision, as will soon be shown, far
outstripped state law abortion permissiveness in 1973. Infra notes 120–31 and
accompanying text.
102. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 793 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 793–94. Justice Powell, of course, disagreed with this assessment.
He believed that abortion liberty “was based firmly on . . . [a] long-recognized
and essential element of personal liberty,” i.e., “‘freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life,’” flowing from decisions like Griswold. City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983)
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring)). See Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 74, at 17 (quoting Powell as stating that “the concept
of liberty was the underlying principle of the abortion case—the liberty to make
certain highly personal decisions that are terribly important to people”). That
Powell did not distinguish between abortion and contraception is perhaps most
clearly shown by a phrase in Moore, in which he summarizes earlier Supreme
Court decisions that recognized fundamental rights: “[These decisions] were
immediately concerned with freedom of choice with respect to childbearing,
e.g., . . . Roe v. Wade, Griswold . . . .” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 500 (1977). Equating abortion with contraception is indefensible in regard
to both biology and constitutional analysis. Supra notes 52, 70 and
accompanying text.
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unsatisfying explanation of Powell’s vote with the majority in
Roe. Are other rationales more compelling?
C. Not Satisfactorily Explained by Appealing to the Future
If Griswold lacks persuasive power,104 are there better
explanations of Powell’s vote? Professor Jeffries explores one
option: “Underlying Powell’s abortion vote was an appeal to the
future.”105 State abortion laws were “slowly and haphazardly”
becoming “more permissive.”106 “Constitutionalizing abortion
would merely speed that process.”107 Thus, according to Jeffries,
“Powell meant to anticipate popular sentiment, not to supplant it.
By leaping over the current legislative muddle, the Court would
achieve—quickly, cleanly, and without wrenching divisions—the
solution toward which the country as a whole was clearly
aimed.”108
This “speed-up-the-future” rationale conflicts with any notion
of judicial restraint in applying/interpreting the Constitution.109
It is not the Court’s job to shortcut the legislative role.110 As

104. “Even conceding all the prior precedents, one still must rank the
abortion decision as among the most venturesome acts of judicial innovation in
the history of the Supreme Court.” JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 349.
105. Id. at 350.
106. Id. at 351.
107. Id. Professor Krotoszynski believes that Roe preempted the process by
which a new fundamental right to abortion choice might one day have been
legitimately identified. E-mail from Ronald J. Krotoszynski, John S. Stone
Chairholder of Law & Dir. of Faculty Research, Univ. of Ala. Sch. of Law, to
author (Mar. 7, 2014, 12:14 AM) (on file with author).
108. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 352. Needless to say, this prediction was
spectacularly wrong as to the impact of Roe, as Professor Jeffries recognizes. See
id. at 354–55 (describing how Roe “energized the right-to-life movement”).
109. It is surprising that Jeffries does not mention this flaw in Powell’s
thinking. Instead, he comments on “the profound irony . . . [in] Powell’s haste
toward the future he thought inevitable.” JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 352.
“[P]olls confirm that support for freedom of choice is strong and widespread, but
also that the opposition to it is committed and unreconciled. . . . Though the
right is secure, the issue remains corrosively divisive.” Id. Thus, Powell’s
advance-the-future motivation “may have made that future more costly to
attain.” Id.
110. See Randolph, supra note 2, at 1061 (explaining the dangers of judicial
legislation).
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Judge Friendly stated in his unissued abortion opinion, political
contests “must be fought out through the democratic process, not
by utilizing the courts as a way of overcoming the opposition of
what [pro-choicers] assume[,] but [judges] cannot know[,] to be a
minority[,] and thus[, by] clearing the decks, . . . enable
legislators to evade their proper responsibilities.”111 Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Powell’s former clerk and a longtime family
friend,112 colorfully expresses the same idea: “[T]he club of
unconstitutionality is a weapon of last resort, precisely because it
so often knocks every other player out of the ring.”113
Even if one concedes some relevance to judicial forecasts of
the future, how astute were Powell’s predictive powers? Professor
Jeffries argues that the high abortion rate after Roe “tend[s] to
confirm the practical assessment on which Powell’s vote had been
based.”114 This contention ignores two critical facts. First, it was
Roe itself that removed virtually all legal barriers to abortion.115
Second, as Professor Jeffries writes,
Roe boosted the ideology of choice. The Supreme Court’s
decision did not merely expand the practical opportunity for
abortion; it declared abortion available as a matter of right. It
said that there was something fundamentally wrong with
compelling a pregnant woman to carry an unwanted child to
term. It . . . placed the enormous authority of the Supreme
Court behind a woman’s freedom of choice.116

The fact is that Powell’s prediction was startlingly
incorrect.117 The abortion controversy started prior to
111. Id. “It is the people at the ballot box who should decide, not the people
wearing black robes—the many, not the few.” WILKINSON, COSMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 114.
112. See JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 54–56, 562 (describing the relationship
between Powell and Wilkinson).
113. WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 106.
114. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 353.
115. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (explaining how the Supreme
Court, not the Constitution, required abortion on demand).
116. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 353–54.
117. Professor Ely shared Powell’s mistake. See Ely, supra note 22, at 947
(asserting that Roe likely aligned with public sentiment). Admittedly, Powell’s
and Ely’s prognosis was not unreasonable based on state legislative
developments through 1970. See id. at 947 n.136 (describing the trend toward
“less stringent” abortion statutes and repealing criminal penalties for some
abortions); infra note 119 and accompanying text (noting the states which
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Roe.118 Although pro-choice advocates made significant gains in
the late 1960s and early 1970s,119 by 1971 “a large, vigorous prolife movement . . . was beginning to win the public debate on
abortion.”120 As stated by historian Daniel K. Williams, “[i]n the
spring of 1971, pro-lifers defeated abortion legalization bills in all
twenty-five of the state legislatures that considered them. . . .
Pro-lifers were equally successful at the ballot box. When
Michigan and North Dakota introduced voter initiatives to
legalize abortion in 1972, . . . both measures [were defeated] by
wide margins.”121

allowed for abortion before Roe). But they both missed the fact and/or the
significance of pro-life political victories beginning in 1971. See infra notes 120–
21 and accompanying text (explaining the pro-life movement’s success
immediately before Roe).
118. See infra notes 119–21 (describing the abortion debate in the years
prior to Roe).
119. “By the end of 1970, fourteen states . . . allowed for abortion in limited
circumstances—usually rape and incest, dangers to a woman’s physical and
mental health, or suspected fetal deformity.” Daniel K. Williams, No Happy
Medium: The Role of Americans’ Ambivalent View of Fetal Rights in Political
Conflict over Abortion Legalization, 25 J. POL’Y HIST. 42, 50 (2013). Most of these
laws followed the pattern of the “model abortion law” promulgated by the
American Law Institute in 1959. Id. at 46, 50. In addition, in 1970, “four states
removed nearly all restrictions on first- and second-trimester abortions,
essentially legalizing abortion-on-demand.” Id. at 42.
120. Daniel K. Williams, The Real Reason to Criticize Roe, PUBLIC
DISCOURSE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/01/7679
(last visited Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. Id. And what was the record as a whole in the two years immediately
prior to Roe? “From December 1970 until January 1973, no other states
legalized abortion-on-demand and only one state liberalized its abortion law—
and it did so only because of a court order.” Williams, supra note 119, at 42. For
criticism of several others’ “fundamental historical ignorance” in regard to
stalled pro-choice legislative efforts, see David J. Garrow, Roe v. Wade
Revisited, 9 GREEN BAG 71, 73, 75–76 (2005). What explains this “sudden
reversal in fortune for the abortion rights movement in 1970”? Williams, supra
note 119, at 43. Williams attributes the change to the belief of most Americans
“that a fetus has intrinsic value, but not an absolute right to life.” Id. The latter
view in the 1960s “allowed proponents of abortion law liberalization to gain
widespread support in their campaign to loosen restrictions on abortion.” Id. But
the former view “posed problems for the abortion rights movement in the early
1970s, when abortion law became more liberal than prevailing public sentiment
and abortion rights supporters began arguing that fetuses had no rights at all.”
Id.
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Roe brought this tumultuous popular contest to a screeching
halt.122 According to Williams,
Roe stopped a victorious pro-life movement in its tracks and
deprived it of its gains [earned] through the democratic
process. It forced dozens of states to legalize the [abortion]
procedure against the will of their citizens. When Roe was
issued, only nineteen states had adopted liberalized abortion
laws, and only four . . . allowed abortion on demand. Roe
required every state to allow abortion on demand.123

Thus, Roe did not simply provide a nudge to a future already
unfolding according to a widely shared view of how best to handle
the abortion issue. Instead, the Court imposed its own vision of
the common good124 upon a largely unwilling populace.125 Roe
thus “represents an act of judicial aggrandizement: a transfer of
power to judges from the political branches of government—and
thus, ultimately from the people themselves.”126

122. Prior to Roe, abortion choice was recognized as a constitutional right
under some state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199–
200 (Cal. 1969) (recognizing a fundamental right to choose abortion in California
and reasoning “[t]hat such a right is not enumerated in either the United States
or California Constitutions is no impediment to the existence of the right”). But
such rulings still left realistic room for a political response through attempts to
amend the state constitution or to obtain federal legislative action.
123. Williams, supra note 120. The Roe Court in essence denied that it had
imposed abortion on demand. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973)
(stressing that the right to abortion is not absolute). Chief Justice Burger stated
this conclusion explicitly: “Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the
Constitution requires abortions on demand.” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208
(1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Burger later changed his mind. Infra
note 205. Nonetheless, Roe prescribes abortion on demand because throughout
the pregnancy no meaningful restrictions are allowed in regard to the reasons
for seeking an abortion. For the first two trimesters, the Court makes this point
explicitly. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. For the third trimester, i.e., post viability, id. at
160, the Court purports to allow states to prohibit abortion (but they are not
required to do so). Id. at 164–65. The required health exception, id. at 165,
however, deprives the unborn of any meaningful protection. See Calhoun, supra
note 74, at 37–39 (describing the very broad scope of the health exception, which
accounts for both emotional and physical harm).
124. See supra text accompanying note 116 (describing Roe as signaling that
it is morally wrong to deny women abortion choice).
125. See supra text accompanying note 123 (explaining how Roe imposed a
right of abortion against the will of most American citizens).
126. Wilkinson, Of Guns, supra note 30, at 254.
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Additional evidence of Roe’s anti-democratic intervention is
supplied by its companion case of Doe v. Bolton.127 That litigation
invalidated Georgia’s enactment of the American Law Institute’s
Model Abortion Act.128 Of the eighteen States that liberalized
their abortion laws prior to Roe, fourteen had followed this
pattern.129 These statutes allowed abortion only in designated
exigent situations such as fetal deformity, rape or incest, or
serious risk to the woman’s health or life.130 In striking these
laws down and instead imposing abortion on demand, Roe and
Doe compelled a level of abortion permissiveness far surpassing
that prevalent in most abortion-liberal states in 1973.131 This in
itself is enough to refute the “speed-up-the-future” rationale for
Powell’s vote.
D. Not Satisfactorily Explained by Empathy
President Barack Obama has generated much discussion by
identifying empathy as an important trait for a Supreme Court
Justice.132 Lewis Powell would have pleased the President in this
regard, for Powell’s empathy was exalted in an important
moment at his confirmation hearing. An attack had been
launched against Powell based on his record on race, and a key
part of his defense was to present endorsements.133 According to
Professor Jeffries, “[t]he high point of this strategy was an
extraordinary letter from Jean Camper Cahn,” who extolled
Powell for several reasons, including his “instigat[ing] an
127. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
128. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055–56 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
129. Supra note 119.
130. Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
131. Supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
132. See Dahlia Lithwick, Once More, Without Feeling: The GOP’s Misguided
and Confused Campaign Against Judicial Empathy, SLATE (May 11, 2009, 7:15
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/05/
once_more_without_feeling.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2013) (identifying
President Obama’s “repeated claim” about empathy’s importance and explaining
how this sparked a “war on empathy” between Democrats and Republicans) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 233–36 (describing this attack, the
charges against Powell, and the people that endorsed him).
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invitation that made her the first black lawyer, male or female, to
address a plenary session of the American Bar Association
annual meeting.”134 The letter ended with “a moving tribute”:135
I am drawn inescapably to the sense that Lewis Powell is,
above all, humane; that he has a capacity to empathize, to
respond to the plight of a single human being to a degree that
transcends ideologies or fixed positions. . . . In that court of
last resort to which I and my people so frequently must turn
as the sole forum in which to petition our government for a
redress of grievances, it is that quality of humanity on which
we must ultimately pin our hopes in the belief that it is never
too much to trust that humanity can be the informing spirit of
the law.136

Senator Birch Bayh said in Powell’s presence that this language
was “particularly important to some of us who must make this
decision.”137 In the subsequent Judiciary Committee Report
recommending confirmation, Senator Bayh joined Senator
Edward Kennedy and two other Senators in giving their
individual reasons for supporting Powell.138 Their statement
closed with the foregoing quotation.139
The evidence suggests that Powell’s empathy for women
desperate to end unwanted pregnancies contributed significantly
to his vote in Roe.140 First, empathy led him to support
134. Id. at 236.
135. Id.
136. Nominations, supra note 23, at 285.
137. Id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). Powell responded that the
praise was “far more than any man deserves.” Id. at 281 (statement of Lewis F.
Powell).
138. EXEC. REP. NO. 92-17, at 5 (1971).
139. Id. at 8.
140. Another Powell vote has been attributed to his empathy. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982), presented “the question [of] whether a state could deny to
the children of illegal aliens the free public education that it provides to other
children.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101
HARV. L. REV. 399, 403 (1987). Powell, fewer than ten years earlier, “had written
the Court’s opinion holding that the Constitution creates no ‘fundamental right’
to education.” Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 29 (1973)). Fallon, his law clerk, “therefore assumed that the Justice would
vote to find states free to withhold public education from the children of illegal
aliens.” Id. Instead, Powell, after lying awake “much of the night,” voted the
other way. Id. Even though “the path to upholding the children’s claim . . . was a
legally difficult one,” Powell’s compassion prevailed. Id. He believed “it would be
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invalidating the challenged abortion statutes in the first
instance.141 Second, empathy in part led him to advocate for a
broader abortion freedom than Justice Blackmun had first
contemplated.142
A personal experience “convinced Powell that women would
seek abortions whether they were legal or not and that driving
the practice underground led to danger and death.”143 This
conclusion was bolstered by “all the horrifying stories of
unsanitary butchers and coat-hanger abortions” that Powell had
heard from several obstetricians in his extended family.144 “From
this perspective, Roe was simply the right and decent thing to do.
in no one’s long-term interest to create a perpetual underclass of uneducated
permanent residents.” Id. Powell also opposed the law for penalizing and
stigmatizing children “due to a violation of law by their parents.” Plyler, 457
U.S. at 238–39 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The
Wages of Crying Wolf Revisited: The Essential Consanguinity of Lochner, Roe,
and Eastern Enterprise, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 133, 145 (2002) (explaining
that Powell’s Plyler vote arguably is an instance when his “commitment to
justice overcame his commitment to formal process and legal doctrine”).
141. See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (explaining that Powell
believed that invalidating the statutes would end the unsafe and inhumane
abortion practices).
142. See infra text accompanying notes 153–60 (explaining that “Powell
pushed Blackmun” for a broader freedom).
143. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 347. Powell had helped an office boy in his
law firm deal with the aftermath of an illegal abortion in which the young man’s
girlfriend had bled to death. Id. “Powell, shaken by this grisly event, persuaded
prosecutors not to file charges against the young man [who had helped perform
the abortion], and once on the Supreme Court he championed women’s right to
choose so that they would not die in circumstances like that.” Steven Conn, Rob
Portman, Nancy Reagan and the Empathy Deficit, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5,
2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-conn/rob-portman-nancyreagan-_b_3022352.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong argue
that this incident determined Powell’s Roe vote despite his “conclusion that the
Constitution did not provide meaningful guidance” on abortion. WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 54, at 230. “If there was no way to find an answer in the
Constitution, Powell felt he would just have to vote his ‘gut.’” Id. Professor
Jeffries questions the word choice but says that “the sentiment rings true.”
JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 346. Basing constitutional decisions on one’s gut is
hardly consistent with what one expects of a “disciple of restraint.” Id. at 349.
Doing so also demonstrates that in this instance Powell was unsuccessful in
fulfilling the commitment he made in his Confirmation Hearing—to resist any
influences resulting from his personal experiences. Supra text accompanying
note 24.
144. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 54, at 230.
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It would end the horror and humiliation of self-induced or underground abortions and return the abortion decision to safe and
responsible hands.”145
Judge Friendly, at the time he wrote his unissued abortion
opinion, believed that the societal impact of illegal abortion
“militate[d] against” state abortion restrictions.146 Prohibiting
abortion had “created illegal abortion mills.”147 Whereas a
wealthy woman had safe abortion options, a poor woman “was
relegated to . . . undergoing, or undertaking, procedures
threatening her health or even her life.”148 Nonetheless, he wrote
a draft opinion arguing that addressing abortion involved
“‘[p]olicy choices’” best committed to the representative branches
of government, not the courts.149
Justice Powell’s response to illegal abortion is one empathetic
policy choice, but certainly not the only one. One can think of
several relevant considerations.150 How widespread were illegal
abortions in the pre-Roe era? How many women were harmed?
How safe is legal abortion? Does killing an embryo or fetus take a
human life? If so, does the illegal abortion argument collapse? If
mothers could kill their newborns only in ways that risked their
own lives, would we legalize killing babies to make it safer for
mothers who want to kill them? People might respond in various
ways to these questions. Why should Lewis Powell’s individual
response, as an “extraconstitutional value preference[],”151 be
accorded special deference?152
145. LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 368.
146. See Friendly, supra note 14, at 32–33 (describing the harms of unsafe
abortion procedures before Roe and Doe and explaining how these harms
particularly affected poor women).
147. Id. at 33; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (referring to
“high mortality rates at illegal ‘abortion mills’” in a discussion of the State
interest in protecting women’s health).
148. Friendly, supra note 14, at 33.
149. See Randolph, supra note 2, at 1060–61 (arguing that such choices
“must be fought out through the democratic process, not by utilizing the courts,”
which would “enable legislators to evade their proper responsibilities”).
150. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Samuel W. Calhoun & Andrea
E. Sexton, Is It Possible to Take Both Fetal Life and Women Seriously? Professor
Laurence Tribe and His Reviewers, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 437, 477 n.202
(1992).
151. See supra text accompanying note 103.
152. “A judge’s view of the law may be esteemed; a judge’s view on policy is
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Justice Powell’s empathy also in part led him to advocate
expanding the period during which a State could not prohibit
abortion.153 To consider this dimension of Powell’s role in Roe, we
must assume a fundamental right to abortion. Even after
declaring this right, the Roe Court still had to decide when a
state’s interest in protecting fetal life became compelling, thereby
allowing a state to override the woman’s freedom to choose
abortion.154
Justice Blackmun originally proposed the end of the first
trimester as the time a State could intervene to prohibit
abortion.155 Until then, a woman would have virtually unfettered
freedom to abort.156 Powell pushed Blackmun to expand the
abortion right to the point of fetal viability,157 which in 1973 was
roughly at the beginning of the third trimester.158 In a November
29, 1972, letter to Blackmun, Powell quoted Judge Jon O.

worth no more than any other.” Wilkinson, Of Guns, supra note 30, at 322 ; see
also WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 106 (“When
judges lay aside the law for policy, shall we listen to them then?”). It is
significant to recall that Professor John Hart Ely also had much empathy for
women facing unwanted pregnancies. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying
text (acknowledging the serious costs imposed by having a child). Nonetheless,
he opposed recognizing abortion choice as a fundamental right. Supra text
accompanying notes 85–87.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 157–164 (noting that Powell pushed
for a longer period for protecting abortion and explaining his reasoning for doing
so).
154. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973) (explaining that the
Court has held that most laws regulating fundamental rights are subject to
strict scrutiny).
155. JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 341.
156. Id. Blackmun admitted that this point was “arbitrary,” but stated that
“perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, . . . [would be]
equally arbitrary.” Id.
157. Id. at 341–42. Clarke Forsythe points out how “careless” it was for the
Court even to consider shifting to viability: “[V]iability, and its implications,
were never argued in the lower courts, never briefed in the Supreme Court, and
never mentioned, even once, during the four hours of oral arguments in
December 1971 and October 1972.” CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION:
THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. WADE 141 (2013). Judge Friendly also had concerns
about the weak record in Roe. See Friendly, supra note 14, at 36–39 (discussing
the safety of legal first-trimester abortions).
158. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (“Viability is usually placed at about seven
months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”).
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Newman’s defense of the viability line in Abele II:159 “‘[T]he state
interest in protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside
the uterus could be shown to be more generally accepted and,
therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than the
interest in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not
viable.’”160 This letter was undoubtedly prompted by a memo
submitted to Powell two days earlier by his clerk, Larry
Hammond. This document, after referring to Judge Newman’s
viability line, stated that the controversy about when life begins
“[a]t some point . . . does not appear to be so great. Most people
would probably agree that the state has a much greater interest
in protecting a viable entity than it does at some earlier time.”161
In the left-hand margin, Justice Powell marked this passage with
a vertical line and signified his agreement by the word “[y]es.”162
Powell was also influenced by a December 11, 1972 memo
from Hammond that described “the most important practical
consideration[s]” favoring viability:
For many poor, or frightened, or uneducated, or
unsophisticated girls the decision to seek help may not occur
during the first 12 weeks. The girl might be simply hoping
against hope that she is not pregnant but is just missing
periods. Or she might know perfectly well that she is pregnant
but be unwilling to make the decision—unwilling to tell her
parents or her boyfriend.163

159. 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
160. Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Nov. 29, 1972), at 1 (on
file with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law)
(quoting Abele II, 351 F. Supp. 224, 232 (D. Conn. 1972)). In the left-hand
margin, Justice Powell marked this passage with a vertical line and signified his
agreement with the word “[y]es.” Id.
161. Memorandum from Larry Hammond, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the
U.S., to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 27, 1972),
at 4 (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of
Law).
162. Id.
163. Memorandum from Larry Hammond, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the
United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court of the United
States (Dec. 11, 1972), at 1 (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington and
Lee University School of Law).
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In the memo’s left-hand margin, Powell marked this passage with
a curly bracket and signified his agreement by the word,
“[y]es.”164
In regard to the alleged lack of agreement for protectable
fetal status prior to viability, one wonders how Powell explained
the fact that at the time of Roe, almost all the states still afforded
legal protection to pre-viable fetuses.165 And this situation cannot
be dismissed as attributable to old, out-of-date statutes, because
substantial contemporaneous political activity confirmed a
present commitment to continue this protection.166 Some people,
perhaps many, disagreed with this stance, but, as Judge Friendly
argued, how does personal disagreement deprive a state of the
power to act?167
And what was Roe’s argument for the substantive validity of
the viability line? Here is the key passage: “With respect to the
State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus [at
viability] . . . presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother’s womb.”168 Professor Ely forty years ago
attacked the Court for “mistak[ing] a definition for a
syllogism.”169 The phrase “begging the question” also comes to
mind. Roe in effect says that viability is the compelling point
because that’s when the fetus becomes viable.170 Professor Randy
Beck criticizes the Court for failing “to offer any constitutional
principle connecting state regulatory power and the value of
developing fetal life that—when combined with the Court’s
definition of viability—would entail the conclusion that the state
164. Id. For a helpful summary of Powell’s importance in expanding the
abortion right to viability, see David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe,
AM. LAW., May 2000, at 80.
165. See supra text accompanying note 123 (explaining that, prior to Roe,
“only four [states] . . . allowed abortion on demand”).
166. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (describing pro-life political
victories immediately prior to Roe).
167. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (asking why state legislatures
lack power to decide abortion questions while they have power in other contexts
in which views are split); see also supra note 78 (same).
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
169. Ely, supra note 22, at 924.
170. See supra text accompanying note 168 (displaying Roe’s circular
reasoning regarding viability).
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can only prohibit abortion of a viable fetus.”171 Professor Beck
also attacks viability for its moral randomness in depending upon
four morally irrelevant variables: (1) the fetus’s year of
conception; (2) where the abortion is performed; (3) doctors’
differing perspectives in assessing fetal survival prospects; and
(4) the disparate impact of race and gender on survivability.172
Justice Powell’s special solicitude for certain women seeking
abortion also enters into a moral evaluation of the viability line.
He urged extending the time for abortion because a firsttrimester cut-off would disadvantage “poor,” “frightened,”
“uneducated,” and “unsophisticated” girls.173 Powell’s concern
appears empathetic. But an overall evaluation is more
complicated. Is abortion necessarily best for all these girls? Might
not even legal abortion have physical and psychological risks? If
the poor are largely black,174 is abortion’s disparate impact upon
a particular racial minority problematic? And what of the fathers
involved in the terminated pregnancies? Does empathy include a
place for the feelings of men affected by the loss of their
developing children? And what about the destroyed fetal lives
themselves? Is there no empathy for them?
III. Conclusion: Impact on Powell’s Legacy
Justice Powell’s vote with the majority in Roe is indeed
baffling. It is not satisfactorily explained by Griswold as

171. Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 249, 270 (2009).
172. Id. at 257–61. It is noteworthy that prominent pro-choice advocates
have also criticized the viability concept. Carl Sagan, for example, maintained
that “[v]iability arguments cannot . . . coherently determine when abortions are
permissible.” Carl Sagan & Ann Druyan, Is It Possible to Be Pro-Life and ProChoice?, PARADE MAG., Apr. 22, 1990, at 8.
173. Supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. Powell’s clerk, Larry
Hammond, wrote to him that a first-trimester rule would fall “most heavily” on
“the poor and the black.” Memorandum from Larry Hammond, Law Clerk,
Supreme Court of the United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme
Court of the United States (Dec. 12, 1972) (on file with the Powell Archives,
Washington and Lee University School of Law).
174. See supra note 173 (including these two demographics in the same
generalization).
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precedent,175 by appealing to the future,176 or by empathy.177 The
question yet to be explored is how this confounding vote should
impact Powell’s legacy.
175. Supra Part II.B. I am aware that since Roe there have been multiple
efforts to bolster its outcome with constitutional theories not used in Roe itself.
E.g., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
“Today the gender-equality argument is plainly dominant in the justification of
Roe.” JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 364 n.*. Because “[t]he argument from equality
was not yet developed in 1973,” LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 371, evaluating this
theory is beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks to assess Justice Powell’s
vote as of the time he cast it. For my views on equality-based defenses of Roe,
see Calhoun & Sexton, supra note 150, at 474–83.
176. Supra Part II.C.
177. Supra Part II.D. Professor Jeffries suggests that the “[m]ost important”
reason for Powell’s vote may have been the existing firm majority for striking
the abortion statutes at the time he arrived on the Court. JEFFRIES, supra note
27, at 349–50. Powell thus “had no reason to think that his vote would matter
one way or the other.” Id. at 350. Jeffries acknowledges that the fact “the issue
seemed settled was in itself no reason to support the constitutionalization of
abortion,” but nonetheless concludes that this situation “eased Powell’s way into
a preexisting majority.” Id. Jeffries may well be right, but this still is an
unsatisfactory explanation of Powell’s vote. As we have seen, Powell played an
active part in the deliberations and was instrumental in expanding the
unfettered abortion right to fetal viability. See supra notes 153–64 and
accompanying text (explaining that Powell advocated for the viability standard
and why he believed in that standard). Not only were Powell’s reasons for this
expansion unconvincing, supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text, but also
his active participation had implications for how the Justices would view their
decision in Roe. “Any fears . . . [they] may have had that they were embarking
on a radical course would have been allayed by Powell’s presence and
performance.” LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE:
VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S
RULING 228 (2012).
Some might proffer another possible explanation for Powell’s vote—he was
very new on the Court, with just over one year’s service. Supra text
accompanying notes 37–38. Perhaps the natural diffidence of a relatively new
Justice made him reluctant to confront his more experienced colleagues. This
theory, although plausible in the abstract, is contradicted by Powell’s actions,
noted in the previous paragraph, in urging Justice Blackmun to expand the
unfettered abortion right to fetal viability. The “diffident Powell” theory is also
undercut by his actions in another controversial decision even earlier in his
tenure, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman, decided roughly six
months after Powell’s installation, involved a constitutional challenge to three
death sentences, two from Georgia and one from Texas. Id. at 239. The Court
invalidated the death sentences as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, id. at 239–40, and Powell filed a fifty-six page dissenting opinion,
id. at 414–65, which plainly demonstrates his willingness to speak out despite
being a newcomer.
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I begin with the unremarkable observation that no one of us
can be perfectly consistent in following our principles. Thus, it is
not particularly surprising that Powell may have experienced
lapses in his effort to exercise judicial restraint. This is in essence
the conclusion of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III.178 Powell “took
Admittedly, there are important differences between Furman and Roe. The
Fifth Amendment refers to capital crimes once directly and twice indirectly.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. This fact was very important to Powell’s conclusion that
“there cannot be the slightest doubt that [the Framers] intended no absolute bar
on the Government’s authority to impose the death penalty.” Furman, 408 U.S.
at 419–20 (Powell, J., dissenting). There is no comparable constitutional
language endorsing a governmental right to proscribe abortion. Thus, the
Furman majority may well present a stronger case of judicial activism than does
Roe’s. Nonetheless, as Professor Jeffries acknowledges, Roe is an extreme
example of activism. Supra text accompanying notes 30–34. It is therefore
appropriate to contrast Powell’s dissent in Furman with his joining the Roe
majority.
Powell’s Furman dissent presents several interesting ironies. One is that
the case involved Texas and Georgia, as did Roe and Doe. More significant is the
substance of Powell’s argument, which contains numerous points that this
Article argues should have appeared in a Powell dissent in Roe/Doe. Powell’s
Furman dissent is too long to be exhaustively described, but one passage is
sufficient to demonstrate its relevance to Roe:
[The ruling] invalidates a staggering number of state and federal
laws. . . . The Court’s judgment not only wipes out laws presently in
existence, but denies to Congress and to the legislatures of the 50
States the power to adopt new policies contrary to the policy selected
by the Court. . . .
In terms of the constitutional role of this Court, the impact of the
majority’s ruling is all the greater because the decision encroaches
upon an area squarely within the historic prerogative of the
legislative branch . . . . It is the very sort of judgment that the
legislative branch is competent to make and for which the judiciary is
ill-equipped. Throughout our history, Justices of this Court have
emphasized the gravity of decisions invalidating legislative
judgments, admonishing the nine men who sit on this bench of the
duty of self-restraint, especially when called upon to apply the
expansive due process . . . rubric[]. I can recall no case in which, in
the name of deciding constitutional questions, this Court has
subordinated national and local democratic processes to such an
extent.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 417–18 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 461–65
(describing how the Court’s ruling deprives states of legislative power). This
quote’s final sentence presents the most striking irony. In a few short months,
Powell would himself significantly contribute to a stunning subordination of
democratic governance in Roe.
178. Judge Wilkinson was Justice Powell’s former clerk and a personal
friend. Supra text accompanying note 112.
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the habit of deference seriously.”179 Yet even though his “career
was governed by canons of caution, [Powell] nonetheless voted
with the majority in Roe v. Wade,”180 a decision that Wilkinson
vigorously condemns as the antithesis of restraint.181
I could conclude here by simply agreeing with Wilkinson that
Justice Powell, “for all . . . [his] talent, [was] unable to make of
restraint a prevalent and enduring creed.”182 But I am compelled
to proceed, in part because of the subtle warning in Professor
Thomas Reed Powell’s famous statement, “If you think that you
can think about a thing inextricably attached to something else
without thinking of the thing which it is attached to, then you

179. WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 110.
Powell “practiced a principled restraint.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, A Tribute to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1987) [hereinafter
Wilkinson, Tribute].
180. WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 109.
Judge Wilkinson believes that Powell’s Roe vote is also inconsistent with his
vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (holding that Georgia’s
sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals) (Powell,
J., concurring). See Wilkinson, Tribute, supra note 179, at 420 & n.17 (offering a
comparison between Roe and Bowers as evidence that “[s]ome of [Powell’s] votes
are not easy to reconcile”). As further evidence that Powell was not always
consistent, after his retirement he recanted his vote in Bowers. Powe, supra note
30, at 44. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), may be another decision in which
Powell’s vote was inconsistent with his basic judicial philosophy. See supra note
140 (discussing Plyler and the basis for Powell’s vote in that case).
181. See supra note 30 and text accompanying note 126 (describing Judge
Wilkinson’s qualms with Roe). In view of Judge Wilkinson’s strong denunciation
of Roe, his measured criticism of Powell’s vote in itself demonstrates judicial
restraint, no doubt in part due to Wilkinson’s long and close association with the
Justice. Professor Ronald Krotoszynski, in an article discussing “the Supreme
Court’s creation and enforcement of unenumerated constitutional rights,” does
not comment on Powell’s Roe vote. Krotoszynski, supra note 140, at 133. Had he
done so, Krotoszynski, given how he describes Powell, presumably would have
agreed with me that the vote was baffling—Powell was a “[p]rincipled
conservative” who
argued forcefully that the Supreme Court labors under an obligation
to exercise a modicum of self-discipline before interjecting itself into
the most contentious issues of the day. . . . [He] respected and
observed the prudential doctrines that seek to limit the role of the
Supreme Court in a system ostensibly dedicated to democratic selfgovernment.
Id. at 144–45. As this Article has shown, Powell’s Roe vote hardly fits this
description.
182. WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 30, at 110.

962

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 (2014)

have a legal mind.”183 This Article has until now principally
engaged in a detached evaluation of Justice Powell’s Roe vote in
light of his own judicial philosophy. One cannot ignore, however,
the context of this discussion. Abortion necessarily involves the
purposeful destruction of a developing human life. Consequently,
any assessment of constitutional principles, and of Powell’s
legacy, must ultimately take this into account.
Any ill-grounded constitutional adjudication thwarts
democratic self-government. As stated by Justice Byron White,
“decisions that find in the Constitution principles or values that
cannot fairly be read into that document usurp the people’s
authority, for such decisions represent choices that the people
have never made and that they cannot disavow through
corrective legislation.”184 Roe, having no convincing constitutional
basis, is subject to this criticism. But because Roe dealt with
abortion, a deeply controversial moral dispute, the Court’s
usurpation of popular government is especially problematic.185
Consider the moral values that clash in the abortion debate.
“To pro-choicers, the freedom to choose abortion is integral to a
woman’s equality, dignity, and liberty—a critical dimension of a
woman’s right to control her own body.”186 But “to pro-lifers, a
woman who chooses abortion does not simply exercise sovereignty
over her own body, but also takes the life of another human

183. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 n.2 (2013)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 101 (1935) (internal quotation marks omitted)). I use this quote
not to make a point about the physical connection between fetuses and the
women carrying them, but instead to refer to elements of an argument that are
inseparable despite one’s efforts to think of them in isolation.
184. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Conversely, “[b]ecause the Constitution
itself is ordained and established by the people of the United States, [properly
grounded] constitutional adjudication . . . does not . . . frustrate the authority of
the people to govern themselves through institutions of their own devising and
in accordance with principles of their own making.” Id.
185. This Article has previously rebutted the suggestion that the existence
of a popular dispute justifies the Court’s intervention. Supra notes 77–79 and
accompanying text.
186. Samuel W. Calhoun, Why Strive for Balance in a Roe Symposium?, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817, 818 (2014).
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being.”187 It is difficult to imagine a disagreement more
fundamental and seemingly intractable.188
187. Id.
188. The example of second-trimester fetuses makes this clear. The principal
abortion method at this stage of pregnancy is dismemberment by dilatation and
evacuation (D&E). WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 122–56 (1990). Prolifers often combat such practices by displaying graphic images of the results.
Professor Jeffries criticizes such tactics as “savagery.” JEFFRIES, supra note 27,
at 367. Jeffries does not explain his evaluation, but it is easy to see that prolifers and pro-choicers would assess the strategy very differently. A pro-choicer
might be inclined to agree with Jeffries, but a pro-lifer would ask, “What is true
savagery—to show pictures of dismembered fetuses or the dismembering itself?”
Pro-choicers and pro-lifers would also obviously differ in assessing Blackmun’s
decision to expand the unfettered abortion right to viability, but see supra note
123, thereby subjecting second-trimester fetuses to destruction at their mothers’
will. Pro-lifers are no doubt appalled, whereas it is clear that some pro-choicers
view this change as a positive achievement. Justice Powell complimented his
clerk, Larry Hammond, for educating him “on the viability issue.” Memorandum
from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court of the United States, to Larry
Hammond, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 3, 1973) (on
file with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law).
But, in the very next sentence, Powell states that he himself “was perhaps the
first to press for viability change.” Id.; supra notes 153–60 and accompanying
text. Arizona Supreme Court Justice Andrew Hurwitz, former law clerk to
Judge Jon Newman, whose views on viability so influenced Powell, supra notes
159–60 and accompanying text, wrote an entire law review article to claim the
credit for his judge. Andrew D. Hurwitz, Jon O. Newman and the Abortion
Decisions: A Remarkable First Year, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 231 (2002–03).
One’s stance on each of the foregoing situations ultimately depends on how
one views the moral status of second-trimester fetuses. Pro-lifers would accord
them independent moral status and thus argue that there should be no general
freedom to kill them by abortion. Some pro-choicers would disagree, arguing
that only in the third trimester does the fetus become a being with independent
moral status. For some, this time limitation on an unrestrained right to abort,
but see supra note 123, is not based on fetal viability—in other words,
survivability—but rather on fetal brain development. See RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 168–70 (1993) (explaining the relationship between brain activity and
viability); Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 21, 25 (discussing a fetus’s brain
activity in the third trimester and arguing that a trimester approach is thus
better than the current viability framework); Sagan & Druyan, supra note 172,
at 7–8 (discussing when brain waves appear in fetuses and how this should
factor into the abortion timeline). As citizens in a democracy, advocates for both
sides should have been left free to do battle in the political realm on this hotly
contested issue. Instead, Roe (and Powell) unjustifiably accorded constitutional
status to one side of the debate.
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The disputants had already joined in a spirited contest in the
normal venues a democracy affords when the Roe Court, with no
persuasive constitutional warrant, suddenly intervened.189 The
impact on the abortion debate was cataclysmic. In one critical
sense, the debate was ended, for the Court effectively locked the
pro-life side out of the political arena.190 Moral arguments could
still be asserted, but it was no longer possible for pro-lifers to
operate as citizens in a democracy routinely do—attempt to
persuade their fellow citizens that certain moral principles should
be reinforced by law.191
Not only did Roe radically disrupt an ongoing moral debate,
but the Court itself became a participant by putting our legal
system’s “highest moral imprimatur” on abortion.192 Some might
contest this claim, either as to the formal role of the Court in our
government or the informal perception of its decisions by our
189. Roe is of special concern not from the mere fact that abortion is a moral
issue, but because the Court, lacking constitutional authority, intervened in a
moral dispute. As stated by Professor Ely,
the Court often resolves difficult moral questions, and difficult
questions yield controversial answers. I doubt, for example, that most
people would agree that letting a drug peddler go unapprehended is
morally preferable to letting the police kick down his door without
probable cause. The difference, of course, is that the Constitution,
which legitimates and theoretically controls judicial intervention, has
some rather pointed thing to say about this choice. There will of
course be difficult questions about the applicability of its language to
specific facts, but at least the document’s special concern with one of
the values in conflict is manifest. [The Constitution] simply says
nothing, clear or fuzzy, about abortion.
Ely, supra note 22, at 927.
190. Supra notes 122–31 and accompanying text. Following the decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), pro-lifers were given “considerable leeway to discourage . . . [abortion]
through legislation.” LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 485. This Article, however,
focuses on Roe.
191. Amending the United States Constitution was still theoretically
possible, but, given its difficulties, not practically feasible. See U.S. CONST. art.
V (detailing the process by which the Constitution may be amended, providing
that any Amendment must be “ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . ”).
192. Steven G. Calabrisi, How to Reverse Government Imposition of
Immorality: A Strategy for Eroding Roe v. Wade, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85,
85 (2008).
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society. Justice Blackmun presumably also would have objected
to the assertion that Roe provided a positive moral endorsement
to abortion. Blackmun, after all, began the Roe majority opinion
by noting the intense moral debate on abortion, but then quickly
stated that the Court’s “task . . . [was] to resolve the issue by
constitutional measurement.”193 Blackmun went even further,
professing the earnestness of his commitment to rely exclusively
on the Constitution.194
Blackmun’s assertion that constitutional law, not moral
principles, would determine Roe’s outcome, does not diminish the
moral message of the decision. Fundamental rights jurisprudence
requires recourse to moral values, at least as understood by
Justice Powell. As previously noted,195 he recognized that judges,
in evaluating fundamental rights claims, should be constrained
by “careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.’”196 If the
Court concludes that the right to abortion is an aspect of the right
to privacy so grounded in our society’s “basic values” as to be
protected from legislative interference,197 how can it be denied
that the Court placed its moral imprimatur on abortion?
But might not one say that Roe morally endorsed only giving
women a choice,198 not the outcome they might choose, whether
193. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). Many members of the Court
have similarly described their role as interpreters of the Constitution. This is
true both of majority and dissenting opinions, and both with regard to abortion
rights, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1992)
(joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter), and more generally,
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603–04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116–17 (stating that the Court should undertake
this “constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection”).
195. Supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
196. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1932) (citation
omitted). To Justice Cardozo, the issue was whether the putative fundamental
right was “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” or “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
197. This Article has argued that this conclusion is historically indefensible.
Supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
198. Roe’s language has been criticized for emphasizing the doctor’s medical
judgment over a woman’s choice. See, e.g., JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 340
(“Worst of all, the opinion read as if it were not really the woman’s choice that
mattered but rather the medical judgment of her doctor.”). Nonetheless, Roe on
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abortion or maintaining the pregnancy?199 Although initially this
formulation, with which Justice Powell agreed,200 sounds
plausible, it ultimately is unpersuasive. The abortion controversy
presents a stark example of competing moral claims—the
woman’s right to choose versus the fetus’s right to live. Roe
accorded absolute deference to a woman’s choice. A non-abortion
example demonstrates how assuring choice can constitute a
moral judgment. Princeton Professor Peter Singer has suggested
that “[p]erhaps, like the ancient Greeks, we should have a
ceremony a month after birth, at which the infant is admitted to
the community. Before that time, infants would not be recognized
as having the same right to life as older people.”201 The reason he
proffers is to allow identification of infants with “severe and
irreparable disability,” so that their lives could then be
intentionally terminated.202 Consider the implications were a
legislature to pass such a law and a court to uphold it. Most
babies are protected, presumably because society considers it
morally wrong to kill them. The new law, however, would single
out one subclass of babies as killable. Wouldn’t the lack of legal
protection necessarily signal that ending these severely
handicapped lives is morally appropriate?
Similarly, Roe excludes developing human beings from the
law’s protection. Allowing women freely to abort their unborn
children plainly signals that the Court does not consider the
unborn as lives worth protecting.203 Justice Powell played a
its face gave women unfettered discretion to choose abortion for the first two
trimesters, and, in my opinion, conferred that same freedom for the third
trimester as well. Supra note 123.
199. Professor Jeffries would seem to agree. Supra text accompanying note
116.
200. “[T]he public often thinks we approve of action that the Constitution—
in our judgment—permits. For example, we still receive mail criticizing the
Court’s 1973 decision sustaining the right of a woman . . . to have an
abortion . . . . Contrary to public opinion, the Court expressed no view as to the
wisdom or morality of abortions. We simply made a constitutional judgment.”
Constitutional Interpretations, supra note 74, at 16.
201. Peter Singer, Killing Babies Isn’t Always Wrong, THE SPECTATOR, Sept.
16, 1995, at 22, available at http://archive.spectator.co.uk/page/16th-september1995/22.
202. Id.
203. It is therefore inexplicable that the Court professed not to decide when
life begins. Supra note 69.
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significant role in expanding the period of choice to include the
second trimester of pregnancy. Roe and Powell thereby denied to
first- and second-trimester fetuses the legal protection accorded
to babies after birth. This disparate treatment necessarily signals
that terminating these fetuses is morally appropriate.204
Justice Powell, with his Roe vote, deviated from his
principles of restraint in the worst possible circumstances. Not
only did Roe unjustifiably disarm pro-lifers politically in a vitally
important and hotly contested public policy dispute, it did so by
taking sides in the underlying substantive moral debate. Justice
Powell’s baffling Roe vote therefore regrettably, but unavoidably,
tarnishes his legacy as a devotee of restraint.205

204. It is important to remember my contention that the practical effect of
Roe was to confer an unfettered abortion right all the way to birth. Supra note
123. Roe thus also signals the moral permissibility of killing even thirdtrimester, viable fetuses.
205. I thus state my conclusion more strongly than Professor Jeffries’s
similar assessment. Supra text accompanying note 42. I do so principally for the
reasons given in the Conclusion, but another point is worth noting. Justice
Powell never deviated from his endorsement of Roe, even though its majority
support eroded over time. Chief Justice Burger, for example, who initially
denied that the decision had instituted abortion on demand, supra note 123,
later changed his mind on this point, leading him to support reexamining Roe.
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 782–85
(1986) (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, though, remained a steadfast Roe
adherent. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
420 (1983) (reaffirming Roe); Powell, supra note 24, at 816 (commenting that,
had he been on the Court for Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, because
he “joined Roe and wrote the Court opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., there is no secret as to how [he] would have voted in
Webster”). Because Professor Jeffries emphasizes Powell’s unwavering support
of Roe, JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 353, 369–70, a reader might justifiably find
puzzling Jeffries’s statement that Powell “said privately that the abortion
opinions were ‘the worst opinions I ever joined.’” Id. at 341. It is clear, however,
that Powell here was not referring to Roe’s outcome. Instead, as Jeffries
suggests, Powell was likely referring to Roe’s stated rationale. It troubled Powell
that Roe read as defending doctors’ medical judgment, not women’s right to
choose abortion. See id. at 340. “It was left to Powell, writing ten years later, to
recharacterize Roe as holding ‘that the right of privacy . . . encompasses a
woman’s right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.” JEFFRIES, supra
note 27, at 340 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 419).

